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I Introduction
This article draws on research in Tanzania to
explore the socially embedded nature of instit-
utions for common property resource management
and collective action. It challenges the 'design
principles' common in resource management
literature and explores instead the idea of
'institutional bricolage', a process by which people
consciously and unconsciously draw on existing
social and cultural arrangements to shape instit-
utions in response to changing situations. The
resulting institutions are a mix of 'modern' and
'traditional', 'formal' and 'informal'.
Three aspects of institutional bricolage are
elaborated here: the multiple identities of the
bricoleurs, the frequency of cross-cultural borrow-
ing and of multi-purpose institutions, and the
prevalence of arrangements and norms which
foster cooperation, respect and non-direct recip-
rocity over life courses. I suggest that these aspects
of institutional formation make cooperation
amongst diverse stakeholders possible, even in the
face of competition and uncertainty
2 Livelihoods and Uncertainty
in the Usangu Basin
The Usangu basin is perceived by planners and
policymakers as facing problems of degradation
and depletion of its grazing land and water
resources. This is a critical concern because the
severe drying up of the Ruaha river has potentially
deleterious effects on the perennial swamp (the
ihefu, an area of precious biodiversity), on hydro-
electric power generation, on irrigated agriculture
and on the wildlife tourism potential of the
downstream Ruaha National Park. Ever growing
demand for land for agriculture (particularly for
irrigated rice and maize) restricts grazing areas and
cattle movement routes around villages. To avoid
the consequent conflicts, cattle keepers increas-
ingly graze their herds on the seasonally flooded
grasslands around the ihefu, leading to fears of
destruction of this 'fragile resource'. A DFID-
funded project (Sustainable Management of the
Usangu Wetland and its Catchment - or SMUWC)
is investigating the causes of resource depletion in
Usangu and developing local capacity to manage
the natural environment collectively
Livelihoods in Usangu are characterised by
dynamic ecological, social and economic change
resulting in a number of uncertainties. Substantial
in-migration (of Baluchis from Iran, Maasai and
Sukuma pastoralists from the north and
agriculturalists from other parts of Tanzania) has
led to social and livelihood changes. Increasing
population pressures, climatic variation and
fluctuations in resource availability have resulted in
substantial intra-district movement and the
adoption of risk-minimising strategies such as
cultivation and grazing over wide areas. Develop-
ment interventions in the form of the establishment
of large hydroelectric power schemes and irrigated
rice farms have resulted in changes in land use as
well as intermittent supplies of ever scarcer water.
Economic liberalisation has increased livelihood
insecurity for many and contributed to cyclical
labour migrancy and the commercialisation of
natural resource use. There are highly variable
perceptions of the capacity, trustworthiness and
efficacy of local government institutions. The high
incidence of AIDS in the area has added further to
livelihood uncertainties, critically affecting labour
availability and social relationships.
3 Characterisation of Resource
Conflicts
In project and policy documents and in the
discourse of development at district and regional
level the 'problem' of the Usangu basin is primarily
defined as one of competing groups of users
conflicting over limited 'open access' resources
such as water and land (Devitt 1999). Such
resources are frequently characterised as 'fragile'
and 'depleted' by conflict-ridden overuse. Such an
analysis is familiar and compelling but it requires
some sceptical scrutiny
Whilst potentially 'competing groups' of users in
the Usangu basin are various, the most common
characterisation of this competition is as one
between ethnically based groups of sedentary
agriculturalists (the 'indigenous' Sangu and in-
migrants such as Nyakusa and Hehe) and itinerant
pastoralists (predominantly Il Parakuyu Maasai and
Sukuma), Notably, 'ethnic' agriculturalists pre-
dominate in local political and administrative
structures. Often implied in policy discussions is a
developmental struggle between entrepreneurial
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'modernising' agriculturalists and intransigently
'backward' pastoralists.
Also implied and explicit in documents and debate
is the assumption that land and water resources are
effectively 'open access', that no arrangements exist
to regulate their use and that in the multi-ethnic
Usangu basin with a growing population, 'tradit-
ional' forms of resource management are non-
existent or disappearing. Local formal village
institutions are characterised at best as ineffectual
(through poor communication, high turnover of
officers and lack of resources), at worst as corrupt
and rent seeking (SMUWC 1999). There is then a
perceived management deficit in terms of the
control of natural resources, contributing to greater
uncertainties.
4 Proposed Solutions
Perhaps surprisingly in view of the 'conflict and
corruption' analysis, policy and project documents
assert the 'natural' basis of cooperation latent in
village life and put great faith in the efficacy of new
formal institutional arrangements to support
collective resource management. The proposed
village Land and Natural Resource Management
Committees epitomise ideas commonly expressed
in common property resource management theory
(Ostrom 1990, 1992). They are intended to
operate 'in a formal and transparent way if they are
to work effectively and to win public confidence'.
Their purpose is to assess land and water use
trends, introduce land registration, formulate
village land-use plans, allocate land and water
rights, draft by-laws, and identify and resolve
conflicts. The committees are intended to be
representative, consisting of 'a reasonably small
group' to facilitate consensus on complex issues
and to make it easier to provide training. The
village committees are to be linked with other
layers of resource management arrangements, in
particular through interaction with district-level
natural resource management teams (SMUWC
1999).
The fit of such prescriptions with New Institutional
Economics (NIE)-based theories about the type of
'robust' institution suited to resolving common
property resource management dilemmas is
startling. A focus on formal public structures with
clear boundaries, transparency, representativeness
and the codification of rules through written bye-
laws, contracts and the specification of property
rights is common to the literature on 'design
principles' for institutional development. Ideas
about the benefits of small and relatively
homogeneous groups of decisionmakers (usually
representing 'a community') neatly linked or
'nested' within layers of structures (e.g. at district,
national or regional level) and the possibility of
such groups identifying and implementing an
optimum level of resource use are also prevalent
(Agarwal 1997; Bromley and Cernea 1989; Ostrom
1990, 1992; Wade 1998).
5 The Inadequacy of Common
Property Resource Management
(CPRM) Theory
The faith placed in such formalised arrangements
can be criticised on a number of grounds (Cleaver
2000). These include the functionalist and
normative approach implied, the assumed primacy
of productive and distributional concerns amongst
the participants and the relegating of culture and
social structure to a static 'resource bank' from
which social capital may consciously be drawn to
smooth and facilitate the implementation of good
resource-management decisions.
Key to both theoretical and policy approaches for
natural resource management is the notion that
better institutions can be actively 'crafted' by
resource users and policymakers (Ostrom 1992:
60). Ostrom sees crafting as a continuous, evolut-
ionary process of developing the optimal instit-
ution for the job in hand. Culture and social
structure, then, become the raw material to be built
upon and improved, the institutional resource
bank from which arrangements can be drawn that
reduce the 'social overhead costs' of cooperation in
resource management. Increasingly, such resources
are referred to as 'social capital' but, as Ostrom
herself admits, there is generally a lack of
understanding about how to 'create, maintain and
use social capital' (Ostrom 1992: 23).
Instrumentalist views assume individual actors are
political and social entrepreneurs who knowingly
and rationally utilise social capital to craft
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institutions in pursuit of optimal resource
management. It is often claimed that, in order to
utilise social capital properly, institutions must be
appropriately 'embedded' in the social and cultural
milieu from which the norms to support purposive
decisionmaking can be drawn (Ostrom 1990).
Such concepts of embeddedness tend towards the
functional and are static in their conceptualisation
of culture and tradition.
In common with these institutional theories, the
literature on sustainable rural livelihoods (SRL)
conceptualises social relations as a potential store
of assets upon which people can draw to construct
effective livelihood strategies. SRL literature broad-
ly defines social capital as a resource of reciprocity
and trust which can be drawn upon by households
in the composition of sustainable livelihoods.
Social relations, institutions and organisations are
seen as critical mediating mechanisms as they
enable and constrain the actions of individuals and
households (Scoones 1998; Ellis 2000). Substantial
stocks of social capital are seen as necessary in
generating wealth, both for households and com-
munities, in ensuring effective collective action and
common property resource management and the
proper working of local administrative and political
structures (Narayan 1997).
These functional views of social embeddedness
clearly link with the formalised arrangements
preferred by institutionalists but throw little light
on processes of institutional evolution. I suggest
that these are more ad hoc, approximate and
shaped by the prevailing cultural milieu than is
implied by concepts of design and crafting.
I will proceed to show how a variety of collective
action institutions exist in Usangu in addition to
the new formal resource management structures.
Institutions of cooperation are embedded in
everyday relations, networks of reciprocity and the
negotiation of cultural norms rather than on the
impositions of contracts, assertion of legal rights or
exercise of sanctions. Such socially embedded
forms of interaction also strongly reflect prevailing
distributions of power. Nevertheless, they may
point the way to community relations based on
cooperation and compromise rather than public
confrontation and formal conflict resolution.
6 Institutional Bricolage
The concept of the crafting of institutions suggests
that specific institutions are deliberately developed
for particular functions. This model can be queried
on a number of grounds. Collective action
institutions may be multipurpose, management
may be both intermittent and robust, an integral
part of social relations and a negotiated result of
active assemblage.
An alternative approach to institutions, which
allows us to look beyond the formal organisations
and to conceptualise social relations as more
central than simply context or assets, is needed.
Drawing on the work of Douglas (1973, 1987),
Peters (1994) and Giddens (1984), as well as my
own previous work on resource management in
Zimbabwe (Cleaver 2000), I suggest that the
concept of 'institutional bricolage' enables us to do
this.
Douglas elaborates Levi-Strauss's concept of
'intellectual bricolage' (Douglas 1987: 66) and ex-
tends it to institutional thinking to illustrate how
the construction of institutions and decisions to act
are rarely made on the basis of individual rational
choice, Instead 'institutions do the thinking' on
behalf of people and institutions are constructed
through a process of bricolage - gathering and
applying analogies and styles of thought that are
already part of existing institutions. Symbolic
formulae are used repeatedly in the construction of
institutions, thereby economising on cognitive
energy by offering easy classification and legitimacy
(p. 76). Douglas emphasises the sameness and
constraint of this form of institutional develop-
ment: 'The bricoleur uses everything there is to
make transformations within a stock repertoire of
furnishings' (p. 66). In earlier work Douglas con-
siders the concept of institutional leakage: 'Sets of
rules are metaphorically connected with one
another, allow meaning to leak from one context to
another along the formal similarities that they
show.' (Douglas 1973: 13) This suggests a less
conscious and less rationallfunctional construction
of institutions than that proposed by many authors
writing of the institutions of common property
resource management.
Adapting DougIass and Levi-Strauss's ideas, I use
the term 'institutional bricolage' to suggest how
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mechanisms for resource management and
collective action are borrowed or constructed from
existing institutions, styles of thinking and
sanctioned social relationships. However, I differ
from Douglas's rather structural position in the
extent to which I perceive agency as critical in
shaping and reshaping institutions. Following
Giddens (1984) we can see the individual as a
possessor of agency as well as specific and often
multiple social identities, which may change over
life courses. Different bricoleurs are thus likely to
apply their knowledge, power and agency in
respect of social relations, collective action and
resource manage-ment in differing ways. The result
is a rich diversity of pliable institutional
arrangements.
Rather than seeing people as rational and essent-
ially economic-resource appropriators, we can
reconceptualise them as conscious and uncon-
scious social agents, deeply embedded in their
cultural milieu but nonetheless capable of
analysing and acting upon the circumstances that
confront them. People are highly likely, when
acting consciously, to reduce the cognitive effort
involved in responding to change by drawing on
and adapting existing norms and mechanisms to
new purposes. Less consciously, the use and
adaptation of pre-existing customs and practices
confers new arrangements with the legitimacy of
'tradition', with a sense that this is part of a
generally accepted 'right way of doing things'.
Many of these institutional arrangements are forged
in practice through daily interactions and the
constant use of resources.
I do not wish to pose a realm of 'traditional'
informal, culturally and socially embedded instit-
utions against a 'modern' domain of rationally
designed committees and formal structures, nor to
suggest that one is likely to be better than the other
at resolving conflicts or managing natural-resource
use. Indeed, I suggest that this is false dichotomy
and that local resource-use practices and manage-
ment arrangements are likely to be a complex
blend of formal and informal, traditional and mod-
ern. The evolution of collective decision-making
institutions may not be the process of conscious
selection of mechanisms fit for the collective action
task (as in Ostrom model) but rather a messier
process of piecing together shaped by individuals
acting within the bounds of circumstantial
constraint. Institutions so derived may survive
partly due to the legitimacy bestowed by 'tradition',
the moral command of what went before over the
present (Giddens 1984).
In the rest of this article I will proceed to illustrate
three aspects of institutional bricolage: the multiple
norms and complex identities of the bricoleurs; the
practice of cultural borrowing and adaptation of
institutions to multiple purposes; and the
prevalence of common social principles which
foster cooperation (as well as conflict) between
different groups of stakeholders.
7 Who are the Bricoleurs?
Institutional theory is generally deficient in
investing resource appropriators with any
meaningful social identity It generally emphasises
productive identities (such as 'irrigators', 'pastor-
alists') and a very limited number of social roles
('leaders', 'women'). People participating or
represented in formal institutions are commonly
assumed to have overriding productive incentives
for so doing, and/or clear social roles that render
them fit for the task. In this model there is a key
role for community representatives shaping the
institutions, mediating the social and cultural
norms, producing and interpreting rules and
enforcing sanctions. In them are siipposedly
invested the collective resources of institutional
trust and the legitimacy of authority exercised in
the common good. The emphasis on such
participators is unsatisfactory as formal institutions
often reproduce existing patterns of inequity (in
the case of Usangu, inequalities of wealth and
gender) and may serve to shape and reinforce other
differences.
8 Complex Identities
The privileging of single aspects of people's
identities for institutional purposes is problematic
as it ill reflects complex social and livelihood
identities. In Usangu, for example, people's
interests do not fit easily into the agriculturalistl
pastoralist divide. A large number of the
'pastoralists' are semi-sedentarised and engaged in
cultivation, whilst young 'pastoralist' men and
families engage in migrant labour and local gold
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mining in order to establish themselves
economically Similarly we see that as agric-
ulturalists generate surplus, they may invest in
cattle - evidence to support the concept of ethnic
and livelihood flexibility over life courses. Neither
economic activïties nor ethnic identities may
adequately reflect the complexity of people's
interests or allegiances. Por example, one
interviewee, 'Karim', is a farmer of rainfed maize
and groundnuts. He also engages in business:
buying and selling charcoal and buying rice when
the price is low, storing and selling when it is high.
He is chairman of his hamlet and chairman of the
water committee. He is a Sangu by ethnic origin
and a traditional healer (herbalist). He follows
Sangu traditions and ceremonies, particularly
emphas-ising the worship of ancestors, in order to
ensure the well-being of the family and
productivity of natural resources. He is also a
Muslim, and he and Islamic leaders gather at his
home for prayers and the appropriate Islamic
traditions and festivals.
In emphasising particular identities and roles,
formal institutionalism may not just reproduce but
reinforce social divisions. In previous research in
Usangu, Maganga (1999) failed to find many cases
that would substantiate the discourse of livestock-
based ethnic conflict. However, he pointed out that
recourse to formal institutions for conflict
resolution, shaped by political power relations, can
indeed emphasise ethnic differences. For example,
Primary Magistrates Courts in each village (to
which unresolved conflicts may be referred) and
Ward Tribunals take into account prevailing
'customary law' as well as national legislation in
resolving conflicts. In many areas Sarigu customary
law is applied, although Sangu people may be an
absolute minority in the village, so leading to
perceptions of the unfairness of such formal
institutions (Maganga 1999; Maganga and Juma
1999).
9 Institutionally Excluded
Bricoleurs
In NIE/CPRM theory and the translation of this
into policy, representatives on committees and in
associations directly represent the resource users
by codifying community norms and practices into
more regularised institutional arrangements.
However, norms and practices, and the
relationships of trust and cooperatïon underlying
them, are often generated and negotiated outside
formal institutions. Institutional bricolage, then,
takes place in a wider arena than that defined by
the visible structures of formal resource
management institutions. Evidence from Usangu
illustrates the diverse location of decision making
and the importance of households and wider social
networks in the generation of norms and practices
of resource use. For example, children and young
people play a major role in resource use and
management through practice in Usangu, although
they have no place in formal institutions. Children
as young as three herd small livestock whilst older
children and youths make decisions about where
to take herds to water or feed. In interviews
pastoralist families specify consultation with the
oldest children in decision making, particularly
over matters of livestock welfare, grazing and the
implications for cattle condition. During the dry
season children and young people may graze their
herds very far from home, staying away in 'camps'
at the ihefu for months at a time, managing their
animals and their use of pasture and water. The key
role of children in resource use and their complete
lack of inclusion in formal management structures
raises questions about the mediating processes
between the creation of rules4n-use and their
codification into collective arrangements. The
concept of institutional bricolage allows us to
reflect more adequately the diverse location of the
generation of institutional arrangements.
10 Negotiable Cultural Norms
The concept of bricolage implies an active
assembly of parts and the adaptation of norms,
values and arrangements to suit a new purpose. It
implies both a conscious scrutiny of some beliefs,
and an unconscious acceptance of others in the
construction of institutions. The simultaneous
acceptance and questioning of traditions can be
illustrated by the case of 'Rahel', a Maasai woman
who is also a born-again Christian (Pentecostalist)
and an elder of the church. She belongs to a Maasai
women's choir, which functions as a women
support group, and all members of the household
take part in a collective labour group of ethnically
mixed neighbours for agricultural work. Her
husband has not converted to Christianity and is
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the hamlet leader and a leading member of local
and national Maasai cultural and political
structures. 'Rahel' sees both advantages and
disadvantages to the household of their diverse
cultural and social networks. Her strong Christian
beliefs lead her to question certain manifestations
of Maasai culture, such as consumption of alcohol,
bad language used at ceremonies and the
worshipping of spirits. She approves, however, of
the links which her husband has forged through
his Maasai leadership activities and the social
support provided through marriage arrangements
and extended kïn networks. It was evident from
interviews that cultural norms were heavily
debated in this household and that some accom-
modation between potentially conflicting positions
was arrived at.
These examples illustrate the complexity of
cultural identities shaping people's lives. They also
suggest that people may both unconsciously accept
certain traditions and be discursively critical of
others. If social norms and ideas about the most
appropriate cultural ways of doing things may be
contested or negotiated within families, then
presumably there is scope for similar negotiation
and accommodation within communities. Different
cultural inheritance and traditional practice do not
lead inevitably to conflict, but may well lead to a
richness and diversity of institutional forms.
11 Cultural Borrowing and
Multipurpose Institutions
'Informal' institutions and decision making about
natural resource management are deeply culturally
embedded. Livelihoods are not simply technically
and economically rational sets of survival strategies
in varying contexts, but are clearly linked to ideas
about a way of life, to practices in relation to
resources, to other people and to aspirations that
are heavily loaded with symbolic meaning (Mehta
et al. 1999). This has been well illustrated in regard
to water use (Mosse 1997; Adams 1997).
Institutions formed as a result of bricolage in the
multi-ethnic Usangu basin may be multicultural in
origin, intersecting formal and informal, traditional
and modern domains.
An example illustrates how claims on tradition are
an integral part of institutional bricolage, whilst the
institutions so formed may be a complex mix of
indigenous and modern. Farmers in Usangu
commonly refer to 'traditional' smallholder
irrigation systems (differentiating these from
government-run large schemes) However, this
'tradition' has a relatively recent and exotic
provenance, as modern rice irrigation technology
was introduced into Usangu by Baluchi immigrants
from Iran in the 1940s. 'Traditional' smaliholder
irrigation management draws on adapted comm-
ittee structures introduced under government and
NGO development projects (now mostly defunct)
and on 'indigenous' collective labour arrange-
ments. Whilst water cooperatives and associations
were in some cases established in the past in order
to claim water rights formally, many of these are
non-functional, farmers perceiving them unneces-
sarily bureaucratic in terms of time and effort
(Gillingham 1999). Conflicts over irrigation water
are generally resolved between irrigators them-
selves by reference to 'traditional' elders and
(Sangu) customs. Only if irresolvable are they
referred to the village government and to ward
tribunals. Baluchis resolve disputes through
reference to Islamic law or statutory rights
(Maganga and Juma 1999).
12 The Leakage of Meaning
Although claims on tradition can be seen as
legitimising devices, tradition is not automatically
accepted by all actors, nor is it necessarily
sacrosanct, as we have seen in 'Rahel's questioning
of Maasai culture, above. Paradoxically, the poten-
tial for questioning tradition on the one hand and
the general legitimacy of tradition on the other
means that cultural institutions may be 'borrowed'
between ethnic groups, a key aspect of bricolage.
The leakage of cultural rules and meanings across
ethnic divides is well illustrated by the case of
Mama N'Giriama, the caretaker of an important
Sangu shrine, who conducts the rituals concerning
the fertility and well-being of the ihefu and the
people who live there. In her interpretation of the
wishes of the ancestral spirit she emphasises
incorporation and accommodation. She claims that
there is a place for all on the ihefu, as long as people
show proper respect and ask permission of the
spirit to use it. The rituals she conducts appear to
have become a multi-ethnic institution. For
example, Sukuma and Maasai pastoralists (whose
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own ancestral spirits are based in distant lands of
origin) may come and seek the blessing of the
N'Giriama spirit so that their cattle do not get lost
or stuck in the ihefu. Similarly, people of different
ethnic origins consult Mama N'Giriama for help in
solving personal or health problems.
13 Multipurpose Institutions
Contrary to institutional theory, single purpose
institutions are not favoured through processes of
institutional bricolage. In the multiple processes of
institutional evolution through bricolage, existing
decisionmaking arrangements and relations of
cooperation may be co-opted for new purposes.
Such adapted, multipurpose institutions abound in
Usangu. For example, evangelical church choirs
seem to be some of the most vibrant forms of
associational life, with membership crossing
ethnic, gender and livelihood divides. Members
not only sing in church but may also join together
in rotating credit groups, collective labour groups
(also working as hired labour gangs on village
works) and singers at 'traditional' social ceremonies
and functions. Such embedded institutions com-
bine productive and social functions and draw on
both traditional and modern forms of interaction.
14 Adapting Traditional
Arrangements
In processes of borrowing and adaptation the
distinction between what is modern and what is
traditional becomes blurred. Additionally, the line
between 'formal' organisation and socially and
culturally embedded networks through which
cooperation is forged becomes blurred. In Usangu
we find an adaptation of traditional Sukuma
militias of young men to replace or supplement
official Village Defence Committees. In several
villages fear of cattle theft, the need to resolve
potential competition over grazing and lack of
confidence in government institutions has led to
the local establishment of a Sungusungu or cattle
militia, borrowed from Sukuma customary defence
organisations. Such institutions have become cross-
ethnic, with Sangu and Maasai, as well as Sukuma,
operating as 'commanders'. The Sungusungu is
made responsible by village consensus for cattle
security and keeping order in the grazing lands. It
operates on a basis of demarcation of roles between
elders and youth, a practice common to all ethnic
groups, with the youth acting as the foot-soldiers
and the elders acting as advisors on tactics,
bestowers of charms and medicines, and
dispensers of justice. This unofficial militia is
considered by members to be formally accountable
to (modern) village government, whilst the
practices of its operation are largely based on
socially embedded principles of reconciliation and
conflict minimisation. The Sungusungu, like many
institutions formed through processes of bricolage,
is multipurpose. Villagers reported how they call
on Sungusungu when facing problems requiring
collective action, such as searching for a lost child,
and use Sungusungu communication channels to
disseminate messages around the village. One of
the Sungusungu operating amongst seasonal grazing
camps at the ihefu, organises the disparate camps of
young men (from widely dispersed villages) into
units. The commander collects a seasonal sub-
scription of cash from them and this is used as a
common welfare fund to pay for a bus or bicycle to
transfer a sick herder to his home area.
It is not necessarily the case that the social and
cultural embeddedness of institutions economises
on transaction costs (Mehta et al. 1999), as in
processes of institutional bricolage 'the categories of
political discourse, the cognitive base of the social
order are being constantly negotiated' (Douglas
1987: 29). Drawing on legitimising tradition and
existing forms of interaction may indeed economise
on cognitive effort, but collective consensus decision
making, forging and renegotiating norms, main-
taining social networks, reputations and relations of
trust are not easy processes, and require
considerable time and energy (Cleaver 2000). This is
particularly significant as poor people find such
costs a heavy burden. An example of the effortful
creation and maintenance of norms is seen in the
priority given to avoiding or resolving conflicts, and
in constructing institutional mechanisms that
emphasise reconciliation, forgiveness and an
expectation of future cooperation.
15 Conflict Avoidance and
Cooperation
Project and policy approaches tend to see conflict
as undesirable, as a breakdown in normal relations,
something to be avoided or resolved as quickly as
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possible. They optimistically insist on perceiving
cooperation as the norm and as 'the basis of village
life' (Devitt 1999). Perversely, though, formal
institutional arrangements often emphasise the
open confrontation of difference and the penal-
isation of non-conformers. However, evidence of
conflict and cooperation suggests a more complex
picture than this. Conflict is both an integral part of
normal life and something to be avoided or
underplayed whenever possible.
A basic psychological dislike of conflict is illus-
trated by interviews with people who identify the
occasional conflicts with neighbours and kin as
major (if intermittent) sources of stress in their
lives, especially when associated with witchcraft.
Additionally, where relations of reciprocity and
institutions help to channel access to resources
(Berry 1989), then conflict must be avoided to
ensure secure access to material livelihood assets.
In Usangu, agricultural and pastoral families are
networked through labour exchange, the use of
draught power and by intermarriage as well as by
church and club membership. But an over-
emphasis on direct and instrumental reciprocity is
misplaced. Relations of cooperation may be
indirect and function across life courses and even
generations as well as across localities. Additionally,
many interviewees, when asked to identify the
benefits of belonging to specific groups and
associations, emphasised the opportunity for
enjoyable social interaction, and of social and
psychological support, in addition to functional
and productive benefits.
A more cultural view suggests that principles of
social respect are deeply embedded and that these
link moral behaviour to individual and community
well-being (Cleaver 2000). The role of the super-
natural (spirits, the ancestors and God) in securing
the well-being of both humans and natural
resources is strongly linked in cultural codes to
people's behaviour - principles of respect and the
desirability of peaceful coexistence being strongly
emphasised, as illustrated in the case of Mama
N'Giriama cited above.
There is strong evidence that norms of conflict
avoidance and conflict minimisation are common
to all types of resource users in Usarigu. Despite the
rhetoric of high levels of conflict in Usangu and
supposed irreconcilability of different cultures,
Maganga (1999) found very few cases of conflicts
over resources reaching court, reflecting a strong
desire amongst people to resolve these at the lowest
possible level. Principles of social respect and
deference to elders are common to all social
groups, and indeed our interviewees suggested that
people not only inherit positions as leaders but
may also earn them through their ability to resolve
conflicts and encourage harmonious relations with
communities.
16 Celebrating Reconciliation
The imperative towards emphasising cooperation,
even where conflict exists, is strong. Evidence of
potential conflict being minimised and turned
towards cooperation instead is illustrated in
accounts from Usangu and elsewhere in Tanzania
(Mnzava 2000; Maseruli 2000). These illustrate
how communities (often hamlets and villages) may
impose fines or penalties on those repeatedly
offending against communal rules or failing to
cooperate in communal work. Such penalties are
only imposed when the social situation and
extenuating circumstances of the offender are taken
into account, a certain amount of 'social riding'
being permitted. In the relatively uncommon event
of fines actually being levied, then the proceeds
(money, livestock, household goods) are used to
fund a celebration (a beer drink or feast) for those
who did participate in the communal activity as
well as for the offender. According to informants,
one of the purposes of this occasion is to 'celebrate
forgiveness'. This practice of socially embedding
relations of cooperation and reinforcing the
positive aspects of communal arrangements is in
direct contrast to formal institutional cLesign
principles, which emphasise the need for impartial,
rigorously enforced sanctions against non-cooper-
ators. Such principles emphasise confrontation and
punishment rather than compromise and reconcil-
iation and are likely to erode rather than reinforce
the social trust on which institutions depend.
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17 Conclusions
In this article I have tried to illustrate how the
introduction of 'formal' modern institutions or
organisational arrangements may not be the most
effective strategy for dealing with conflicts over
resource management, relying, as they do, on
principles derived from abstracted and universal-
ised 'design principles'. These may result in inad-
equate institutional solutions, as they fail to
recognise the depth of social and cultural embed-
dedness of decision making and cooperative
relations. 'Formal' institutional arrangements may
be based on principles which bypass or contradict
those inherent to local decision making and
cooperation, such as the minimisation of conflict.
In doing so, formal institutional arrangements may
erode rather than build social capital. Finally, new
'formal' institutions are unlikely to have evolved
through a process of institutional bricolage and
therefore may be perceived by local people as
costly, lacking in legitimacy and cumbersome in
terms of existing social arrangements and resource-
use practices.
It is possible and indeed likely that such new
institutions gradually will be subjected to a process
of evolution; that over the long term, institutional
bricolage will ensure that they either fall into disuse
or are adapted and combined with other local
mechanisms to create socially embedded resource-
use arrangements.
I see greater scope for robust management of
natural resources if processes of institutional
bricolage are recognised and built upon by
policymakers, instead of adhering resolutely to
detached and abstracted formal institutional
models. There is a need to recognise institutions as
the ongoing, temporary products of complex social
processes rather than simply emphasising their
manifestation as structures and outcomes, delib-
erately crafted. How far institutions formed
through processes of bricolage are likely to meet
the developmental aïms of social equity and
sustainable resource use, however, remains a
question for further exploration.
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